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CORRELATED  EQUILIBRIUM  AS  AN  EXPRESSION  OF 
BAYESIAN  RATIONALITY 
BY ROBERT  J. AUMANNI 
Correlated equilibrium is formulated in a manner that does away with the dichotomy 
usually perceived between the "Bayesian" and the "game-theoretic" view of the world. 
From the Bayesian viewpoint,  probabilities should be assignable to everything, including 
the  prospect  of  a  player  choosing  a  certain strategy in  a  certain game. The  so-called 
"game-theoretic" viewpoint  holds  that probabilities can only be assigned to  events not 
governed by rational decision  makers; for the latter, one  must substitute an equilibrium 
(or other game-theoretic) notion. The current formulation synthesizes the two viewpoints: 
Correlated equilibrium is  viewed  as the  result of  Bayesian  rationality; the  equilibrium 
condition appears as a simple maximization of utility on the part of each player, given his 
information. 
A feature of this approach is that it does not require explicit randomization on the part 
of the  players. Each player always chooses  a definite pure strategy, with no  attempt to 
randomize; the probabilistic nature of the strategies reflects the uncertainty of other players 
about his choice. Examples are given. 
KEYWORDS:  Correlated equilibrium, Bayesian rationality, information, noncooperative 
games, strategic equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, common priors, Harsanyi doctrine. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
0  wad some pow'r the giftie gie us 
To see oursels as ithers see us! 
-Burns 
THE  EQUILIBRIUM  CONCEPT  of  Nash  (1951),  together with its refinements,  is 
without  doubt  the  single  game-theoretic  tool  that  is  most  often  applied  in 
economics. Yet, though at first the definition seems simple and natural enough, 
a little reflection leads to some puzzlement as to why and under what conditions 
the players in an n-person game might be expected to play such an equilibrium. 
Recall that it is defined as an n-tuple of strategies in which the component strategy 
of  each player maximizes that player's utility given that the other players are 
playing their components.  Now  why should  any player assume that the other 
players will play their components  of such an n-tuple, and indeed why should 
they? This is particularly perplexing when, as often happens, there are multiple 
equilibria; but it has considerable  force even when the equilibrium is unique. 
Indeed, there are games whose  Nash  equilibria appear quite unattractive even 
though they  are unique  (see  Harsanyi,  1977, p.  125); and  even  without  such 
examples, it does not seem clear why the players would play even a unique Nash 
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equilibrium. In a two-person game, for example,  Player 1 would play his com- 
ponent only if he believes that 2 will play his; this in turn would be justified only 
by 2's belief that 1 will indeed play his component; and so on. To many this will 
sound like a plain old circular argument: consistent, perhaps, but hardly com- 
pelling. 
Nash  equilibrium does  make sense if one  starts by assuming that, for some 
specified reason, each player knows which strategies the other players are using. 
But this assumption appears rather restrictive. 
Another criticism of  equilibrium that has been  advanced  is that it appears 
inconsistent with the modern subjectivist, Bayesian view of the world. According 
to  the  Bayesian  view,  subjective  probabilities  should  be  assignable  to  every 
prospect, including that of players choosing  certain strategies in certain games. 
Rather than playing an equilibrium, the players should simply choose strategies 
that maximize their utilities given their subjective distributions over the other 
players' strategy choices. 
It is the purpose of this paper to provide a simple rationale for equilibrium. 
Surprisingly, our rationale is precisely in terms of the "criticism" in the previous 
paragraph. We will show that, far from being inconsistent with the Bayesian view 
of the world, the notion  of  equilibrium is an unavoidable  consequence  of that 
view.  It turns out, though,  that the  appropriate equilibrium notion  is  not the 
ordinary mixed strategy equilibrium of Nash (1951), but the more general notion 
of correlated equilibrium. 
Specifically, we will show the following.  Let us be given an n-person game G 
in strategic (i.e. normal) form. Assume that (i) as in Savage (1954), each player 
has a subjective probability distribution over the set of all states of the world; 
and  (ii)  it  is  common  knowledge3 that  each  player  chooses  a  strategy that 
maximizes his expected utility given his information. Then the strategies chosen 
by the players constitute a correlated equilibrium of G. Conversely, each corre- 
lated equilibrium of G can be obtained in this way for an appropriate choice of 
the parameters. A precise formulation and proof will be found in Section 3. 
To some readers, this may seem obvious. Once one has the formulation, it is 
indeed embarrassingly  easy to prove, as we shall see. But it should not be confused 
with certain characterizations of  Nash  equilibrium, which look  similar but are 
actually much more transparent. There one assumes not only that each player is 
a utility maximizer, but that he knows the strategies actually being used by all 
other players. We make no such assumption; indeed, in our treatment, the players 
do not in general know how others are playing. We assume only that it is common 
knowledge  that all the  players are Bayesian  utility maximizers, that they  are 
rational in  the  sense  that each  one  conforms  to  the  Savage theory.  Such an 
assumption underlies most of game theory, and of economic theory as well; we 
show  that  it,  by  itself,  is  enough  to  assure that  the  outcome  is  a  correlated 
equilibrium. 
3An  event is common knowledge among a set of agents, if it is known to all, it is known to all that 
it is known to all, and so on ad infinitum. See Lewis (1969) and, for a precise mathematical formulation, 
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An  important feature  of  our  approach  is  that  it  does  not  require explicit 
randomization on the part of the players. Each player always chooses  a definite 
pure strategy, with  no  attempt to  randomize; the  probabilistic  nature of  the 
strategies reflects the uncertainty of other players about his choice. This will be 
discussed in detail in Section 6. 
The basic  idea  of  this paper is extraordinarily simple; the main theorem is 
proved in less than a dozen lines. Some conceptual issues do arise, but still, we 
cannot grasp how such a simple idea grew into a paper of this length. A reader 
just interested in the main points, who knows what a correlated equilibrium is, 
should read Sections 3 and 6 only. Those not familiar with correlated equilibria 
should read Section 2 first. 
2.  CORRELATED  EQUILIBRIUM 
Let G be an n-person game in strategic form. For i = 1, . . .,  n, denote by S' 
the set of pure strategies-henceforth  actions-of  Player i, and by h'(s) the payoff 
to  i  for  an  n-tuple  S:=(S1,...,Sn)  of  actions.4 Set  S:=S1  - -  xS'  and  h:= 
(h',...,  hn).  Define  a  correlated strategy n-tuple in  G  as a function f  from a 
finite5 probability space F into S; that is, as a random variable whose values are 
n-tuples of actions. 
Correlation is a more general form of strategy randomization than mixing. In 
both cases, the players base their choice of an action on observation of a random 
event; with mixed  strategies, the  observations  are independent,  whereas with 
correlated strategies, they  need  not  be.  To  see  that  mixed  strategies may be 
formally viewed  as correlated strategies, take F  to be the product probability 
space  F1 x ...  x Ff,  where F'  is the probability space  by means of  which  i's 
mixed strategy is defined-the  set of outcomes of his roulette spin. The simplest 
examples of "true" correlation (nonindependent action choices)  occur when all 
players base  their choices  on  observation  of  the  same  random variable.  For 
example, in the prisoner's dilemma of Figure 1, the symmetric efficient outcome 
can be achieved  if  both players simultaneously  observe a single toss  of  a fair 
coin, then play (top, right) or (bottom, left) according as to whether heads or tails 
came up. It cannot, however, be achieved by mixed strategies. 
In  general,  the  observations  of  the  players  need  be  neither  identical  nor 
independent. Chance chooses  an element y of F, then suggests to each player i 
2,2  0,6 
6,0  1,1  I 
FIGURE  1 
4The symbol  :=  means that the expression on the left is being defined. 
5I.e., with a finite number of points (and so also of events). The finiteness of F  plays no role in 
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that he take the action f'(y)  (:= (f(y)').  If all players follow the suggestions, the 
correlated strategy n-tuple f  results. 
The functionf  may be identified with the n-tuple (f',...  ,fn).  If g' is a different 
function from F to S', then as usual, 
(f- 
i  gi)  =  (f1  fi-1  gi,fi+1  f.n) 
Throughout the sequel, E  denotes "expectation." Iff  is a correlated strategy 
n-tuple, note that h'(f)  is a real-valued random variable. 
DEFINITION  2.1:  A  correlated equilibrium (c.e.) in  G is a correlated strategy 
n-tuple f  such that 
(2.2)  Eh'(f)>  Eh'(f-'  gi) 
for each player i and each g' that is a function off'. 
In form this definition is very similar to that of Nash equilibrium. Equilibrium 
is achieved  when no player can gain by deviating from the suggestions,  given 
that the others obey them. The deviations g'  are restricted to be functions of f' 
(i.e., compositions of some other function with f)  because i is informed off'(y) 
only, and so can distinguish only between members of F  that are distinguished 
by ft. 
It will be useful to define the distribution of a correlated strategy n-tuple f  as 
the function that assigns to each n-tuple s of actions the number Prob {f-'(s)}. 
Much like mixed strategies, correlated strategy n-tuples can for most practical 
purposes be identified with their distributions. Thus the correlated strategy n-tuple 
discussed  above  (Figure  1)  can,  using  a  familiar  notation,  be  written  '(top, 
right) +  (bottom, left). Another way to represent the distribution is to insert the 
appropriate probability in each square of the payoff matrix; for the above example, 
the distribution is that of Figure 2. 
This distribution is not a correlated  equilibrium  distribution  (c.e.d.), i.e., it does 
not represent a correlated equilibrium. Indeed,  in the prisoner's dilemma, it is 
always worthwhile for Player 1 to play bottom, also if it is suggested that he play 
top. Figure 3 contains an example of a game ("the battle of the sexes")  and a 
correlated strategy distribution that is in equilibrium. If top is suggested to  1, 
then he knows that left was suggested to  2, so  he would  lose  by deviating to 
bottom; similarly if bottom is suggested, and for Player 2. 
By similar methods  it  may be  seen  that  any  convex  combination  of  Nash 
equilibria is a correlated equilibrium. But there are also other kinds of correlated 
0  2 
2  0 
FIGURE  2 
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2,1  0,0  0  2 
0,0  1,2  0  2 
FIGURE  3 
6,6  2,7 
7,2  0,0 
FIGURE  4 
equilibria. For example, Figure 4 illustrates a two-person game ("chicken") with 
three Nash equilibria, whose payoffs are (2.7), (7.2), and (42, 42). The distribution 
of  Figure 5 may be seen to be a correlated equilibrium, whose  payoff (5,5)  is 
outside  the  convex  hull  of  the  Nash  equilibrium payoffs.  It follows  that the 
distribution of  Figure 5 is itself outside the convex hull of the Nash equilibria. 
Other examples of correlated equilibria that are outside the convex hull of the 
Nash  equilibria may be  found  in Aumann (1974);  for a particularly beautiful 
example, see Moulin and Vial (1978). 
Computationally, correlated equilibria are simpler objects than Nash equilibria. 
The correlated equilibrium distributions of a given game G constitute a compact 
convex polyhedron whose  defining linear inequalities  can be explicitly  written 
down. Here we treat only the two-person case, which is notationally less cumber- 
some; the principle, however, is no different in the general case. 
Let n=2;  set 1:=IS'1,  m:=1S21, hjk:=h(j,k)  for jeS1  and keS2.  Let  1  and 
Ek  denote summation over all j in S1 and all k in s2 respectively. The distribution 
of a correlated strategy pair is an lm-tuple (Pik),  where j  and k range over S 
and s2  respectively, 
Pjk  ' 0  forallj  and k,  and  E2  Pjk=1. 
j  k 
We will call such objects simply distributions for short. 
I  1 
3  3 
3  0 
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PROPOSITION  2.3:  A  distribution (Pjk)  is a correlated equilibrium  distribution  if 
and only if 
(2.4)  E(hJk-  hqk)Pik O  for all j, q in S,  and 
k 
E  (h2  -  h2)pjk > 0  for all k, r in S2. 
J 
PROOF:  For (2.2) it is necessary and sufficient that for each i, the expectation 
still obeys the inequality when conditioned  on each possible value of f,  i.e. on 
each possible  "suggestion" to  Player i (a suggestion is called possible if it has 
positive probability). Suppose j is a possible suggestion to Player 1, i.e., Ek Pjk > 0. 
Given this suggestion, the conditional probability of 1 that k was suggested to 2 
is  Pik/lk  Pjk,  hence  l's  conditional  expected payoff is Ek hkPjk/pkPjk,  which  we 
denote  Hl(jlj).  If  1 were to  deviate to the action  q, his conditional  expected 
payoff would be EkhqkPjk/lZkPjk,  since the payoffs change, but l's  information 
remains the same; we denote this by Hl(qlj).  The equilibrium condition  (2.2) 
for i = 1 says that deviation to q is not worthwhile, i.e., that H1(j Ij)  H1(q Ij); 
if we multiply through by ZjPjk,  we obtain (2.4). Similarly, (2.5) is seen to express 
the equilibrium condition  (2.2) for i = 2. 
Definition 2.1 appears a little different from our 1974 definition of correlated 
equilibrium; there, the players may get more information about y than just the 
suggested action fi(y).  It turns out, though, that practically speaking, the two 
definitions are equivalent. This will be discussed again below  (Section 4g). 
3.  BAYESIAN  RATIONALITY  IN  GAMES 
We assume exogenously  given an n-person game as in the previous section. 
Also exogenously given are the following: (i) a finite6 set  2, with generic element 
w; (ii) for each player i in G, a probability measure p' on  2; (iii) for each player 
i in G, a partition  iP'  of  2. The set  2 represents the set of all possible  states of 
the world, and each w denotes a specific such state. The probability measure p' 
is i's prior on fL.  The partition  iP is i's information  partition; if the true state of 
the world is oo  E P E  Pi,  then i knows that some element of P is the true state of 
the world, but he does not know which one it is. 
The term "state of the world" implies a definite specification of all parameters 
that may be the object of uncertainty on the part of any player of G. In particular, 
each w includes a specification of which action is chosen by each player of  G 
at that state wC.  Conditional  on a given wo,  everybody knows everything; but in 
general, nobody knows which is really the true w. Taking the "atoms" of  2 to 
represent complete specifications of all possible variables enables us to represent 
all aspects of uncertainty on the part of any player-including  uncertainty about 
the uncertainty of other players-by  means of the partitions s'.  This constitutes 
the standard model for "differential" ("incomplete") information in multi-person 
contexts; its implications will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
6  See  Section  4c. 
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We will use the following  assumption: 
COMMON  PRIOR  ASSUMPTION:  All the priors p1 are the same; that is, there is 
a probability measure p on Q2  such that pl  =  p2=  ...=  pn  =  p. 
This is  sometimes  called  the  Harsanyi Doctrine. It does  not  imply that all 
players have the  same  subjective probability. The  subjective probability of  a 
player is his posterior given his information; these may well be different. Roughly 
speaking,  the  common  prior  assumption  says  that  differences  in  probability 
estimates of distinct individuals should be explained by differences in information 
and experience. This, too,  will be discussed  further in the sequel,  and we will 
also indicate how our results must be modified when the common prior assumption 
is relaxed or abandoned. 
Denote  by s'(w)  the action chosen by Player i in the game  G at the state to 
of the world. Formally, each si is simply an exogenously  specified function from 
f2 to S'; it may be considered item (iv) in the informational model of the world 
specified at the beginning of this section. We make the modest assumption that 
each player i knows which action he chooses,  i.e., that s' is measurable7 w.r.t. 
(with respect to)  '. 
Let s(w) := (s(c),...  , s  (Gt)) be the n-tuple of actions chosen at state Wt.  Call 
a  player  i  Bayes  rational at  t  if  his  expected  payoff  given  his  information, 
E(h'(s)j1??')(w),  is at least as great as the8 amount E(h'(s  , si)  9'i)(w)  that it 
would have been had he chosen an action si other than the action s"(w) that he 
did in fact choose;  in brief, if he chooses  an action that maximizes his payoff 
given his information. 
MAIN  THEOREM:  If  each player is Bayes rational at each state of the world, 
then the distribution  of the action n-tuple s is a correlated  equilibrium  distribution. 
PROOF:  We must exhibit a probability space  F  and a function f:  F-> S that 
is a correlated equilibrium and that has the same distribution as s. Indeed, if we 
set  F:=  (12,  p),  then s  itself  is  such a function.  To  see  this,  let  i e N,  and let 
g': Q -  S' be any function of si. Since si is $??'-measurable,  g'  also is; that is, it 
is constant on each P in  P'. The Bayes rationality of i at each state implies that 
for each such P and each s' in Si, 
E(h'(s)  I  P)  > E(h'(s-  ,  si) I  P). 
7A  random  variable  is  measurable  w.r.t.  a  partition  if  it  is  constant  on  each  element  of  the  partition. 
Intuitively,  this  means  that  the  r.v.  contains  no  more  information  than  the  partition;  a  person  who 
knows  which  event  in  the  partition  obtains,  also  knows  the  value  of  the  r.v. 
8Recall  that  if  x  is  a  random  variable,  then  E(x  I  '  )  is  defined  as  the  r.v.  whose  value  at  a  specific 
to  is  E(xI  P),  where  P  is  the  event  in  91"  that  contains  co.  (P  represents  i's  knowledge,  the  smallest 
event  that  he  knows  to  have  occurred.) 8  ROBERT  J.  AUMANN 
Taking si to be the constant value of g' throughout P yields 
E(h  (s) I  P)  - E(h1(s-', g') I  p); 
multiplying both sides by Prob P and summing over all P in OP'  yields 
E  (h'(s)) >, Eh'(s-' g') 
For f = s, this is precisely the condition (2.2) that defines correlated equilibrium. 
4.  DISCUSSION 
(a) Personal Choice as a State Variable.  The chief innovation in our model is 
that it does away with the dichotomy usually perceived between uncertainty about 
acts of nature and of personal players. Of course, a player always knows which 
decision  he himself takes; here, this information is not treated differently from 
private information he may have about other aspects of the state of the world. 
This point is a little subtle and is worth some discussion. In traditional Bayesian 
decision theory, each decision maker is permitted to make whatever decision he 
wishes, after getting whatever information he gets. In our model this appears not 
to be the case,  since the decision  taken by each decision  maker is part of the 
description of the state of the world. This sounds like a restriction on the decision 
maker's freedom of action; at a given state co,  it is as if the model forces him to 
take the decision  dictated by cw. 
But closer examination reveals that "freedom of choice" is not an issue. The 
model describes the point of view of an outside observer. Such an observer has 
no a priori knowledge of what the players will choose;  for him, the choices  of 
the players are part of the description of the states of the world. This does not 
mean  that  the  players  cannot  choose  whatever they  want,  but  only  that the 
observer will not in general know what they want. 
This "outside observer" perspective is common to all differential information 
models in economics  (as well as to all extensive  games that are not of perfect 
information). In such models, each player gets some information or "signal"; he 
hears only the signal sent to him, not that of others. In analyzing this situation, 
each player i must first look at the whole picture as if he were an outside observer; 
he cannot ignore the possibility of his having gotten a signal other than the one 
he actually got, even though he knows that he did not actually get such a signal. 
This is because the other players do not know what signal he got. Player i must 
take the ignorance of the other players into account when deciding on his own 
course of action, and he cannot do this if he does  not explicitly include in the 
model signals other than the one he knows he got. The "outside observer" referred 
to above is thus a surrogate for the ignorance of the system as a whole-the  lack 
of common knowledge-of  the signals received by each player. 
Similarly, each player is of course free to choose  whatever action he wishes. 
That we include his action as part of the description of the state of the world is CORRELATED  EQUILIBRIUM 
only a convenient way of expressing the fact that the other players do not know 
which action he wishes to choose. 
The reader may still be puzzled by the fact that in deriving his posterior about 
other players' choices,  each player conditions  on  his  own information, which 
includes his own choice. How can a player's own choice help him to guess what 
other players will do? 
But again, this paradox is illusory. The player is not really conditioning on his 
choice,  but on the substantive information that leads him to make this choice. 
This substantive information leads to a posterior on the other players' choices, 
which in turn leads to an optimal choice, or to a set of such choices. Intuitively, 
the fact that a player's choice is part of his information is used not so much in 
deriving his own posterior about what others will do, but rather in estimating 
the others' posteriors about what he will do. They cannot simply make arbitrary 
"guesses" about this, but must take into account that he is maximizing given his 
own information. Since he is reasoning similarly about them, it appears that one 
might be  led to troubling circular reasoning. This precisely is avoided  by the 
model of the previous section. 
To sum up, a game in which the players do not know what the other players 
do should be treated like any other model of differential information, where the 
possible values of the parameters about which some of the players are ignorant 
are used as specifications of the state of the world. 
(b)  Common Knowledge of Information Partitions and Priors. A question that 
often crops up when models of differential information are discussed is whether 
there can be uncertainty on the part of one player about the information partitions 
P' of other players. 
The answer is "no". While Player 1 may well  be ignorant of what Player 2 
knows-i.e.,  of the element of  p2  that contains the "true" state co  of the world-1 
cannot be ignorant of the partition .2  itself. Indeed,  p2  is part of the description 
of the model, and does not enter the description of any particular co; it therefore 
cannot be the object of uncertainty, it must be common knowledge. 
This is not an assumption, but a "theorem", a tautology; it is implicit in the 
model itself. Since the specification of each co includes a complete description 
of the state of the world, it includes also  a list of those  other states co' of the 
world that are, for Player 2, indistinguishable from co.  If there were uncertainty 
about this list on the part of Player 1 (or of any other player), then the description 
of co  would not be complete; one should then split co  into several states, depending 
on which states are, for 2, indistinguishable from co.  Therefore the very description 
of the co's  implies the structure of  p2,  and similarly of all the ?'i. The description 
of  the  co's involves  no  "real" knowledge;  it  is  only  a  kind  of  code  book  or 
dictionary. The structure of the  >iP  also involves  no real knowledge;  it simply 
represents different methods of classification in the dictionary. 
The situation with priors is similar. Once one accepts the Bayesian viewpoint, 
that each player has a prior on Q, it follows that there cannot be any uncertainty 
on the part of one player about other players' priors. Each player's prior must 
be  common  knowledge  among  all  players.  (This in  itself  does  not  imply the 
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further assumption, which we have made, that all the priors are the same; this 
further assumption will be discussed separately below.) 
The reasoning leading to the conclusion that the priors are common knowledge 
is similar to that leading to the conclusion that the OP'  are common knowledge. 
It is enough to convince ourselves that Player l's prior p1(co) for each given state 
co of the world is common knowledge. If it were not, then the description of co 
would be incomplete; we would be able to split co into several states, depending 
on the various possibilities  for pl(co). 
The  reader may  ask  why  we  adduce  verbal,  informal  arguments for these 
assertions, rather than proving them as formal theorems. The answer is that the 
assertions have no formal content. Within the model, knowledge refers to events, 
i.e., sets of states. One can ask whether at a given state c,  a player i knows an 
event A; this is the case if and only if A includes that element of OP'  that contains 
co.  But neither a partition nor a prior is an event; formally speaking, the concepts 
of knowledge and common knowledge do not apply to them. In the above informal 
discussion,  when we refer to the partitions, say, as "common knowledge", we 
mean that all players know them, all know that all know them, and so on, where 
"know" has its informal, everyday meaning. 
It is important to realize that while the above assertions (that the partitions 
and priors are common knowledge)  aid us in understanding the model, they do 
not  affect the  conclusions.  Each player uses  only  his  own  prior and  his own 
partition in  reaching a decision;  within the model,  it does  not matter that he 
"knows" the partitions and priors of  the others. It is only  in interpreting the 
results that these points become significant. 
(c)  Finiteness of the Model. Unlike the finiteness of F  assumed in Section 2, 
the finiteness of Q does involve some loss of generality. For example, in describing 
uncertainty about other people's uncertainty, it is perhaps more natural to allow 
a continuum of states. Models that do this in full generality and entirely explicitly 
are, in fact, available; e.g., Mertens and Zamir (1985). 
We nevertheless chose the finite model, because the point we make is basically 
very simple, and has nothing to do with whether the model is finite or infinite. 
This simplicity might be obscured by an infinite model, with its relatively heavy 
apparatus of  a-fields,  measures, integrals, Radon-Nikodym  derivatives, and so 
on. Such an analysis can probably be carried out in a manner analogous to that 
presented here; but we have not actually done this, and the possibility of unexpec- 
ted difficulties cannot be excluded. 
In the last analysis, the world  is usually considered  finite; in a sense,  finite 
models do appear more natural. An infinite model is appropriate when there is 
something to be gained from it, when we are dealing with a phenomenon that is 
not  conveniently  expressible  in a finite framework. The choice  of  model  is  a 
matter of convenience; here, the finite model is the more convenient and trans- 
parent one. 
(d)  7he Converse. Let us call the system consisting of 12, p, the OP',  and s an 
information system. The main theorem asserts that under Bayesian rationality, 
every information system corresponds to a correlated equilibrium. The converse CORRELATED  EQUILIBRIUM  11 
also holds: Under Bayesian rationality, every correlated equilibrium corresponds 
to some information system. More precisely, for each game G and each correlated 
equilibrium f  of G, there is an information system for which it is Bayes rational 
for the players to play in accordance with s, and the resulting distribution is the 
same as that of f 
For the proof, note that f  itself provides an example of such an information 
system. We need only define (12,  p):= F, s:= f  and OP'  to be the partition of  Q 
generated by f ' (i.e., co  and co'  are in the same element of  ?P'  iff f  (co) = f  (cow')).9 
Bayesian rationality is then a restatement  of (2.2). Thus under Bayesian rationality, 
the set of all information systems corresponds precisely to the set of all correlated 
equilibria. 
(e) Exogeneity and Endogeneity.  As we indicated at the beginning of the previous 
section, it is probably best to think of the information system as exogenous.  But 
a case could be made for another view. While a part of each player's information 
is undoubtedly generated by overt signals from the outside world, another part 
is obtained by reasoning about how other players reason. For example, this is 
so for the information that a strictly dominated strategy will not be used. Some 
readers might prefer to call that kind of information "endogenous." In actuality, 
much information is a mixture of both kinds, which it is not easy to untangle. 
The distinction  between  "exogenous"  and  "endogenous"  is  often  useful  in 
economics,  but it should not be pushed too far. In the natural sciences,  such a 
distinction is little used.10  When discussing the motion of the planets, should the 
motion of Uranus be considered "exogenous" and that of Neptune "endogenous", 
or the other way around? Perhaps it is not so terribly important. What is important 
is the relationship between the motions. 
The purpose of this paper is to record the observation that common knowledge 
of  rationality implies  correlated equilibrium. For this, it is not very important 
whether the information of the players-or  even their actions-are  considered 
exogenous  or endogenous. 
(f) Mixed Strategies. In view of the fact that the players may wish to use mixed 
strategies, the reader might question the assumption that each player knows his 
own  action.  There is no  problem if,  as usual,  one  thinks of  a mixed  strategy 
simply as a random device for helping the player make up his mind, so that in 
the end he does know which action he takes. But it is conceivable that a player 
can actually commit himself to a mixed strategy before he knows its pure outcome; 
in that case, the assumption in question seems formally incorrect. 
The  simplest  way to  circumvent the  difficulty is  to  say that if  indeed  it is 
possible for a player i to commit himself irrevocably to a definite mixed strategy, 
then such a commitment should  itself be  considered  an action-a  member of 
S'-and  then, of course, there is no difficulty. It should be noted that this will 
9 Note that the definitions of Q2,  p, and s go in exactly the opposite direction from the corresponding 
ones in the proof of the main theorem, where we defined F = (f2, p), f := s. But the proof of the main 
theorem is not simply a mirror image of this one, since there p' was not necessarily generated by f '. 
10 We are aware of the pitfalls of blindly applying the methodology of one science to another. But 
neither should one go to the other extreme, of blindly rejecting all parallels. 12  ROBERT  J.  AUMANN 
not change the set of possible  outcomes; adding an action whose payoffs are a 
convex combination of the payoffs to other actions does not change the set of 
correlated equilibria. 
(g) Alternative Definitions of Correlated  Equilibrium.  In our 1974 definition of 
correlated equilibrium, each player i is endowed  with an information partition 
Ji  on the underlying probability space  (the space of possible  outcomes  of the 
randomizing device).  After finding out which element of  Ji  took place,  i may 
take any action he wishes. Thus an equilibrium is a function from outcomes of 
the randomizing device to action n-tuples, whose ith component is Ji-measurable 
(each player knows which action he takes). The equilibrium condition  is as in 
Section 2 above. 
At first blush, this definition appears different from that of this paper (2.1), 
since here a player is told  only what action he takes, and is given no  further 
information. For fixed Ji,  the definitions are indeed different. But if the Ji  are 
allowed to vary, the set of correlated equilibrium distributions obtained under 
the 1974 definition is the same as that of this paper. 
To see this, note that the 1974 set-up is formally identical with that of Section 
3 above, with Ji  instead of  9?'.  Thus the fact that every c.e.d. in the 1974 sense 
is also a c.e.d. in the current sense is simply a restatement of our main theorem. 
The converse is immediate, since we may, if we wish, take Ji  to consist of the 
coarsest  partition of  the  underlying probability  space  for  which  i's  action  is 
measurable. 
The reason that in this paper we chose the definition without the Ji  is that it 
makes the explicit calculation of the set of all c.e.d.'s more transparent. 
(h) Common Knowledge and Universality.  The formulation of our result in the 
introduction assumes common knowledge (c.k.) of rationality. The formal treat- 
ment of Section 3 assumes universal rationality, i.e., rationality at each point of 
the  state  space  (2. These  two  formulations  are equivalent.  Indeed,  our  1976 
treatment of  c.k. implies that the universal event Q2  is itself c.k. (i.e.,  anything 
that is true at all possible states of the world is common knowledge). Conversely, 
a c.k. event can without loss of generality be assumed universal, because one can 
always restrict the universe to the smallest c.k. event (i.e., to that member of the 
meet A  OP'  of the information partitions that contains the true state c  of the world). 
5.  THE  COMMON  PRIOR  ASSUMPTION 
This section is devoted to a discussion of the only element of our model that 
is not a tautological consequence  of the Bayesian approach: the common prior 
assumption (CPA for short; see Section 3). 
Common priors are explicit or implicit in the vast majority of the differential 
information literature in economics and game theory. As soon as one writes, "let 
p  (rather than p')  be the probability of...",  one has assumed common priors. 
The assumption is pervasive in the enormous literature on rational expectations, 
trading in securities, bargaining under incomplete information, auctions, repeated 
games,  signalling,  discrimination,  insurance,  principal-agent,  moral  hazard, CORRELATED  EQUILIBRIUM  13 
search, entry and exit, bankruptcy, what have you.  Citing the relevant papers 
would make our references longer than our text. Occasionally the definitions do 
pay lip-service to the possibility of distinct priors pi;  but usually this is quickly 
abandoned, and in the theorems and examples, one returns to common priors." 
In game  theory,  the  standard representation of  extensive  games12  involves 
moves of "chance" or "nature" where each alternative has a single probability, 
common to  all players. The standard formulation of  Nash  equilibrium (1951) 
uses mixed strategies for which the probabilities are common to all players. Both 
these  definitions  have  been  used  hundreds-perhaps  thousands-of  times  in 
economic  applications, almost without question. 
Why is this so? Why has the economic community been unwilling, in practice, 
to accept and actually use the idea of truly personal probabilities, in much the 
same way that it did accept the idea of personal utility functions? After all, in 
the development  of  Savage  (1954),  both the  utilities  and the probabilities are 
derived  separately  for  each  decision  maker.  Why  were  utilities  accepted  as 
personal, but probabilities not? 
Perhaps the most basic reason is that utilities directly express tastes, which are 
inherently personal. It would  be silly to talk about "impersonal tastes", tastes 
that are "objective" or "unbiased." But it is not at all silly to talk about unbiased 
probability estimates, and even to strive to achieve them. On the contrary, people 
are often criticized for wishful thinking-for  letting their preferences color their 
judgment. One cannot sensibly ask for expert advice on what one's tastes should 
be; but one may well ask for expert advice on probabilities.13 
On  a  more  pragmatic level,  the  CPA  expresses  the  view  that probabilities 
should  be  based  on  information; that people  with  different information  may 
" A notable exception is Harrison and Kreps (1978). 
12von  Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Kuhn (1953). 
13 That Bayesian decision theory a la Savage derives both utilities and probabilities from preferences 
does not imply that it does not discriminate conceptually between these two concepts. Savage used 
preferences to get a rigorous handle on probabilities, a coherent formulation free of inner contradic- 
tions. At the same time, he strove, to the extent possible, to rid his probabilities of personal elements, 
to make them fit for use not only in decision theory but also for scientific induction.  He was fond 
of  pointing  out  that after sufficiently many observations,  all  "reasonable" priors lead  to  similar 
conclusions.  His -postulate P4 (roughly speaking, that the probability of an event is independent of 
the prize offered contingent on that event) can only be understood in terms of a probability concept 
that has an existence of its own in the decision maker's mind, quite apart from preferences on acts. 
He wrote that ". . . the ...  view sponsored here does not leave room for optimism or pessimism ...  to 
play any role in the person's judgment" (1954, p. 68). And again, "All views of probability are rather 
intimately connected  with one  another.  For example,  any necessary view  can be  regarded as an 
extreme personalistic view in which so many criteria of consistency have been invoked that there is 
no role left for individual judgment" (1954, p. 60). 
Savage is dead-so  much the worse for us-and  one can only speculate as to how he would have 
regarded the CPA. As far as we know, he never dealt formally with more than one decision  maker 
at a time. The CPA can be brought formally into his framework via an axiom that says that under 
common knowledge of rationality, risk averse agents with precisely the same information will never 
bet against each other (one must, in some appropriate way, exclude hedging). Contrary to the modern 
vogue, Savage was not a minimalist; he did not try to make his axioms as few and weak as possible, 
but as useful as possible. At one point he wrote that "the personalistic view incorporates all ...  criteria 
for reasonableness in judgment known to me, and . . . when any criteria that may have been overlooked 
are brought forward, they will be welcomed..."  (1954, p. 67). It's just possible that he would have 
welcomed the CPA. 14  ROBERT  J.  AUMANN 
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legitimately entertain different probabilities, but there is  no  rational basis for 
people  who have always been fed precisely the same information to do so. 
Differently  put,  a  major message  of  modern  economic  theory  is  the  vital 
importance of information in economic activity, and of differences in information. 
Under the CPA, differences in probabilities express differences in information 
only. Thus the  CPA enables  one  to  zero in  on  purely informational issues  in 
analyzing economic  (and other interactive) models with uncertainty. 
If, in spite of all this, we abandon the CPA, all is not lost. One can define a 
subjective correlated equilibrium  as in Section 2, replacing the single probability 
p  on F  by n different probabilities p,  . . . , p'.  In the main theorem, then, one 
must only replace "correlated equilibrium distribution" by "subjective correlated 
equilibrium distribution." 
While such an approach is mathematically perfectly consistent, it yields results 
that are far less sharp than those obtained with common priors. For example, if 
a 2-person 0-sum game G in strategic form has a unique pair s of optimal (maxmin 
and  minmax)  strategies, which  are moreover pure, then  one  would  certainly 
expect rational players to play s; the reasoning leading to this conclusion, which 
was spelled out in detail by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), is extremely 
compelling. And indeed, s is the only correlated equilibrium point 14 in g. But, it 
is far from the only subjective correlated equilibrium point. For example, in the 
game of Figure 6, the unique pair of optimal strategies is (top, left); it leads to 
the payoff + 1 for the row player, and -1  for the column player. But the subjective 
distribution indicated in Figure 7 is a subjective correlated equilibrium; its payoff 
is +3  for each player (in spite of the game being zero sum!), and it makes no 
use at all of the unique optimal strategies. 
0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
1 1  1 1  0,0  3'6  6  3 
0,06933i6 
FIGURE  7 
14 More generally, in any 2-person 0-sum game, all correlated equilibria are convex combinations 
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This game is not a fluke. Quite generally, the concept of subjective correlated 
equilibrium places  very few  restrictions on the  possible  outcomes.  To get the 
flavor of this, note that for any two-person game, not necessarily zero-sum, in 
which there are no  weakly dominated actions, there is a subjective correlated 
equilibrium at which both players assign positive  probability to each outcome 
(action pair); and there is also a subjective correlated equilibrium that gives each 
of  the two  players an expected  payoff as close  as you  wish to  his  maximum 
possible payoff. Such results indicate that the subjective correlated equilibrium 
is a relatively "weak" concept, giving little information; and that while logically 
consistent,  it involves  a  conceptual  inconsistency  between  the  players, which 
distorts and hides the conflict of interests that is the subject of game-theoretic 
analysis. 
The case  of  distinct priors was  considered  by John  Harsanyi (1967)  in  his 
path-breaking papers  on  games  of  incomplete  information;  he  called  it  the 
"inconsistent case." The idea of  subjective randomization was introduced and 
developed  in  our 1974 paper; this idea  depends  essentially  on  distinct priors. 
Neither idea had any considerable  echo.  Apparently, economists  feel that this 
kind of analysis is too  inconclusive  for practical use, and side-steps the major 
economic  issues. 
6.  RANDOMNESS  AS  AN  EXPRESSION  OF  IGNORANCE 
In the traditional view of strategy randomization, the players use a randomizing 
device, such as a coin flip, to decide on their actions. This view has always had 
difficulties. Practically speaking, the idea that serious people would base important 
decisions on the flip of a coin is difficult to accept. Conceptually, too, there are 
problems. The reason a player must randomize in equilibrium is only to keep 
others from deviating; for himself, randomizing is unnecessary. 
The first to break away from the idea of explicit randomization was J. Harsanyi 
(1973). He showed that if the payoffs to each player i in a game are subjected 
to  small independent  random perturbations, known to  i  but not to  the  other 
players, then  the  resulting game  of  incomplete  information  has pure strategy 
equilibria that correspond to the mixed strategy equilibria of the original game. 
In plain words, nobody really randomizes. The appearance of randomization is 
due to the payoffs not being exactly known to all; each player, who does know 
his own payoff exactly, has a unique optimal action against his estimate of what 
the others will do. 
Here we take this reasoning one step further. Even without perturbed payoffs, 
the  players simply  do  not  know  what actions  the  other players will  take.  In 
"matching pennies", each player knows very well what he himself will do, but 
ascribes 2-  probabilities to the other's actions, and knows that the other ascribes 
those probabilities to his own actions. 
With this  view,  mixed  strategy equilibria  appear  quite  special  and  rather 
unnatural. They imply that the players always act as if they all had the same 
beliefs about what all other players will do, and as if these beliefs were common 16  ROBERT  J.  AUMANN 
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knowledge. (The actions themselves, of course, need not be common knowledge, 
except in the case of pure strategy equilibria.) In particular, they act as if15  each 
player  i  always knew exactly  what each  other player believes  about his  (i's) 
actions. 
Correlated strategy n-tuples, on the other hand, do allow for varying beliefs 
about the beliefs of other players. In the distribution of Figure 8, for example, 
Player 1 may ascribe probabilities that are either 2-2  or 3--  to Player 2's actions; 
and 2 can never know what 1 believes about his (2's) actions. Such phenomena 
are often of the essence in the analysis of real situations, but they are ruled out 
by the mixed strategy paradigm. 
In games with more than two players, correlation may express the fact that 
what 3, say, thinks that 1 will do may depend on what he thinks 2 will do. This 
has no connection with any overt or even covert collusion between 1 and 2; they 
may be acting entirely independently. Thus it may be common knowledge that 
both  1 and 2 went to business school,  or perhaps to the same business school; 
but 3 may not know what is taught there. In that case 3 would  think it quite 
likely that they would take similar actions, without being able to guess what those 
actions might be. 
For example, consider the game of Figure 9 (Aumann, 1974). Players 1, 2, and 
3 pick the row, column,  and matrix respectively. No  mixed strategy equilibria 
0,0,3  0,0,0  2,2,2  0,0,0  0,0,0  0,0,0 
1,0,0  0,0,0  0,0,0  2,2,2  0,1,0  0,0,3 
FIGURE  9 
15 The phrase "act as if" means that we ignore irrelevant information, information that does not 
affect the actions of the players. Technically speaking, the corresponding assertions hold when each 
player conditions on his own action only. Without this caveat, they are false. For example, consider 
a three-person game in which each player chooses  0 or 1, and then is paid 0 or 1 according as to 
whether the sum of the chosen numbers is even or odd.  It is a Nash equilibrium for each player to 
play 0 or 1 with 2-2  probabilities. One explicit scenario for this is that each player decides  on his 
action in accordance with a completely private coin toss. A second  scenario is like the first, except 
that 2 observes I's toss. In that case, 2 believes with certainty that 1 will do what he in fact will do, 
but this belief is not shared by 3, who still ascribes probabilities 2-2 to l's  actions. A third scenario 
is like the second,  except that 2's observation of  I's toss is transmitted through a noisy channel; in 
that case,  1 will not know what 2 believes about I's action. (In each case, the scenario is assumed 
common knowledge.) The point is that for practical purposes, all three scenarios are equivalent, since 
the additional information never causes any player to change his action. CORRELATED  EQUILIBRIUM  17 
yield  any  player more than  1. But there is  a  correlated equilibrium yielding 
(2, 2, 2): Player 3 picks the middle matrix with certainty, while 1 and 2 pick (top, 
left) with  probability  2, and (bottom,  right)  with  probability  4.  This  does not imply 
collusion between 1 and 2; it simply means that it is common knowledge that 3 
has no idea what they will do, but does think with certainty that they will either 
play (top, left) or (bottom, right). This, of course, is an extreme situation; it will 
perhaps be more common to find situations where in 3's estimate, the actions of 
1 and of 2 are neither prefectly correlated nor independent. Again, such situations 
are plentiful, but cannot be described by means of mixed strategies. 
7.  THE  LITERATURE 
The idea presented here was briefly outlined in Appendix 4 of Aumann (1981). 
Kadane and  Larkey (1982)  also  expressed  the  idea  that the theory  of  games 
should  be consistent with  Bayesian decision  theory. But they ignored the fact 
that a rational player must take into account  how  other players reason about 
him, and concluded  that under Bayesian theory, nothing  at all could  be said 
about what each player thinks others would  do.  One must, they said, turn to 
disciplines  such as psychology  to gain insight into how rational agents should 
or would play a game. 
More  recently,  Bernheim  (1984)  and  Pearce  (1984)  have  independently 
developed the theory of rationalizability. This is related to the notion of subjective 
correlated equilibrium mentioned in Section 5 above; a rationalizable outcome 
is much like one that occurs with positive probability in a subjective correlated 
equilibrium (see Tan and Werlang, 1984, and Brandenburger and Dekel,  1985). 
Nevertheless,  there are differences; for example,  rationalizability as  currently 
defined does not permit one player to perceive the strategies of other players as 
correlated (see Section 6 above). 
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